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Introduction 
 
Where consumers have complaints about the quality of legal services in the United 
Kingdom, the mechanism for dealing with them has been described as a system of 
“joint regulation” (Barnes 1994: 61). In essence, such a model provides for 
independent supervision of the self-regulatory processes operated by the relevant 
professional bodies. It has also been referred to as a “Super-Escalated Complaints 
Environment” (Customer Management Consultancy Ltd 1998), with the professional 
bodies as the first tier for handling consumer complaints, and an ombudsman, or 
ombudsman-like adjudicator process, as the second tier. This model, involving public 
statutory oversight of private self-regulatory redress systems, can work well. It has 
many advantages, not least being the fact that most of the cost of the scheme is borne 
by the professional bodies. It does, however, depend on the first tier, the professional 
bodies’ own arrangements, being effective.  
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Such a system has existed in England, Wales and Scotland since 1991, with the 
establishment, by statute (Courts and Legal Services Act 1990), of a Legal Services 
Ombudsman for England and Wales, and for Scotland, the Scottish Legal Services 
Ombudsman (Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)(Scotland) Act 1990). In 
Northern Ireland, there is no statutory ombudsman, and the independent element to 
the self-regulatory system is provided by the Lay Observer, a system similar to those 
operating in England and Wales and Scotland before 1991. In the Republic of Ireland, 
an Independent Adjudicator was appointed in 1997 to investigate how the Law 
Society handles complaints from members of the public against solicitors. 
All these schemes provide some supervision of the self-regulatory mechanisms of the 
legal profession. They do so, however, in different ways, and with different degrees of 
independence. The Legal Services Ombudsman scheme for England and Wales has 
been the subject of research (James and Seneviratne 1995). That research concluded 
that that scheme was independent, accountable, fair, and operated efficiently and 
effectively within the powers of the legislation, and within its limited budget. 
However, it was felt that the Ombudsman had not been given sufficient powers in the 
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, to perform an effective oversight function It also 
had to be acknowledged that there was little that the Ombudsman could do if the self-
regulatory mechanisms of the professional bodies were not working effectively. 
There has been no detailed similar evaluation of the work of the Scottish Legal 
Services Ombudsman, the Lay Observer in Northern Ireland, or the Independent 
Adjudicator in the Republic of Ireland [2]. A comparative study of these three 
schemes therefore seemed appropriate, in order to draw some conclusions about the 
suitability of these arrangements for dealing with consumer complaints. The purpose 
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of the study was to evaluate the independent mechanisms in Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and the Irish Republic, and set them within the context of the self-regulatory 
mechanisms of the profession [3]. Each scheme was evaluated to discover the extent 
to which it met the requirements of independence, effectiveness, fairness, and public 
accountability. These are the “four key criteria” which must be met before the British 
and Irish Ombudsman Association [4] will accord public recognition to an 
ombudsman. Of course, not all the schemes use the term “ombudsman” in their title, 
but these criteria form a useful starting point for evaluation. In essence, the purpose of 
all the schemes is to ensure public confidence and client satisfaction in the legal 
profession. The evaluation is to assess the extent to which they do so. 
 
 
Complaint handling by the professions 
The legal professions in the three countries studied are much smaller than in England 
and Wales. In England and Wales, there are about 80,000 practising solicitors and 
over 12,000 practising barristers. In Scotland, there are 8,600 solicitors and between 
300/350 advocates. Northern Ireland has a small number of practising solicitors: 
1,645 in total, which comprise 975 practising partners and 670 assistant solicitors. 
There are less than 500 firms, almost half of which are sole practitioners; 96 per cent 
of the firms have five partners or less. The largest firm consists of 13 partners. In the 
Irish Republic, there are 7,000 solicitors, 5,200 of which have practising certificates. 
Most of the firms in Ireland are small; there are only four firms with 80 or more 
solicitors.  
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Like other professions, the legal professions in the three countries studied operate 
largely by means of self-regulation within a statutory framework. As self-regulatory 
bodies, they deal with complaints about conduct and can impose disciplinary 
sanctions and refer misconduct cases to independent disciplinary tribunals. Most 
consumer complaints are not about issues of a disciplinary nature, but are concerned 
with the quality of service provided. Inadequate professional service complaints 
include excessive delay, failure to respond to calls, failure to follow instructions, 
rudeness, arrogance, and, in particular, the cost of services. The legal professions have 
traditionally concentrated upon misconduct complaints, but they now have 
mechanisms for dealing with consumer complaints about the quality of the service 
provided. 
The legal professions in Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic have not 
suffered the same crisis in complaint handling that has been experienced in England 
and Wales. There, towards the end of the 1990s, complaint handling in the legal 
profession reached a crisis point, mainly for the solicitors profession, where the 
number of complaints in 1998 was well over 30,000. The United Kingdom 
Government responded to this crisis by announcing its intention to take a more 
interventionist approach in this matter, by appointing a Complaints Commissioner, if 
these problems were not sorted out by the profession (See Seneviratne 2000). In 
response, the profession has made efforts to improve its complaints handling record, 
and the Law Society has made significant progress in this area over the past year (see 
Legal Services Ombudsman 2001: 5, 21-22). 
 
In Scotland, the Law Society of Scotland has a statutory duty to investigate 
complaints about solicitors. Complaints are dealt with by the Client Relations Office 
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of the Law Society, and have to be in writing, either by letter or a complaint form. If 
the complaint is about service, rather than conduct, there is an attempt at conciliation. 
If this fails, a formal investigation is undertaken, and the solicitor is asked for a 
response to the complaint. The Client Relations Office gathers the relevant 
information and agrees the heads of complaint. This information is then sent to a 
reporter, who gives an opinion on whether the complaint has been established, 
together with a recommendation for a remedy. These reporters may be legally 
qualified or lay, and they are recruited by the Law Society after open advertisement. 
All reporters are unpaid and their identity is not revealed, which is a cause for concern 
to both complainants and solicitors who are the subject of complaints. The reporters’ 
opinions and recommendations are discussed by the clients relations committees, 
which meet monthly. These committees, which usually agree with the opinion of the 
reporters but not necessarily the recommended sanctions, make a recommendation to 
the Council of the Law Society, which makes the final decision. The awards that can 
be made against the solicitor are the restriction, refund or waiving of fees, 
compensation or both. The maximum award that can be made for compensation is 
£1,000, and the average award is £250. The Law Society can also order solicitors to 
rectify an error which is within the solicitors’ powers to put right, at the solicitors’ 
own expense. 
 
In Northern Ireland, complaints against solicitors are dealt with by the Assistant 
Secretary of the Law Society and the Professional Conduct Committee. If the 
complaint is about inadequate professional services, the Assistant Secretary obtains 
the file and reports to the committee, sometimes with a recommendation. If the 
service complaint is made out, the committee can award a reduction or waiving of 
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fees. There is no power to award compensation. If the poor service complaint is 
deemed serious enough, the committee can issue a reprimand, or refer it to the 
Disciplinary Tribunal. 
 
In the Republic of Ireland, consumer complaints against solicitors are dealt with by 
the complaints section of the Law Society. Complaints have to be in writing, and the 
complaints section try to mediate or negotiate a settlement on an informal basis. A 
decision is reached about a complaint of inadequate professional service on the basis 
of the file, which they request from the solicitor. The sanctions that can be awarded 
are a refund of fees, or rectification of the problem at the solicitor’s expense. There is 
no power to award compensation or damages. If the solicitor does not respond to the 
recommendation, the matter is referred to the Registrars Committee, which can issue a 
direction. This becomes binding within 21 days, and during this time, there can be an 
appeal to the High Court. If the solicitor refuses to accept the direction after 21 days, 
the matter becomes one of misconduct, and is then dealt with as a disciplinary matter. 
 
 
The oversight mechanisms 
 
In all jurisdictions, the primary responsibility for dealing with client complaints rests 
with the professional bodies themselves. If the complainant is not satisfied with the 
professional body’s handling of the complaint, the matter can be referred to an 
independent oversight mechanism.  
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The scheme in Scotland is similar to that in England and Wales. The office of the 
Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman was established in 1991, as a result of the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990. This Act parallels the Act 
setting up the Legal Services Ombudsman in England and Wales, with some 
important differences. As in England and Wales, Scotland used to have a Lay 
Observer, an independent person empowered to examine any allegation from a 
member of the public concerning the Law Society of Scotland’s treatment of a 
complaint against a solicitor. The Ombudsman’s post has developed from this. The 
function of the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman is to investigate the handling of 
complaints against legal practitioners. Dissatisfied clients must first take their 
complaints about legal practitioners to the relevant professional body. If they are 
dissatisfied with the handling of the complaint by that body, they can refer the matter 
to the Ombudsman. The professional bodies subject to the Scottish Legal Services 
Ombudsman’s jurisdiction are: the Law Society of Scotland (which regulates 
solicitors); the Faculty of Advocates (which regulates advocates); and the Scottish 
Conveyancing & Executory Services Board (which regulates qualified conveyancers 
and executory practitioners).  
 
The Ombudsman is concerned that the investigation of the complaint by the 
professional body has been fair and thorough, that all the heads of the complaint have 
been properly addressed, and that appropriate action has been taken. There is no 
jurisdiction to investigate the merits of the decisions taken by the professional bodies, 
that is, there is no power to investigate the original complaint and come to a different 
conclusion. Thus, the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman is performing an oversight 
role for the professional bodies’ complaints systems. This is unlike other ombudsman 
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schemes in the public and private sectors, where the function is to investigate the 
substance of the original complaint, usually after the complainant has not obtained 
satisfaction from the organisation’s internal grievance mechanisms. It is also unlike 
the Legal Services Ombudsman scheme in England and Wales, where, although the 
primary role is the investigation of the handling of the complaint by the professional 
body, the original complaint may be investigated. It should be noted, however, that in 
the vast majority of cases, the Legal Services Ombudsman in England and Wales does 
not use the discretion to extend investigation to the original complaint (see James and 
Seneviratne 1995: 193). Moreover, the number of cases where this was done 
“declined dramatically” in 1999/2000, following a decision by the Legal Services 
Ombudsman to take a “more robust approach” to referring cases back to the 
professional bodies for reconsideration (see Legal Services Ombudsman 2000: 15).  
 
In Northern Ireland independent oversight of the complaint handling process is 
provided by the Lay Observer. The Lay Observer is appointed by virtue of the 
Solicitor (Northern Ireland) Order 1976, as amended by the Solicitors (Amendment) 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1989. The Lay Observer’s remit is limited to the monitoring 
of complaints made to the Law Society of Northern Ireland about the conduct of 
solicitors. The Lay Observer is concerned with the manner in which the complaints 
are dealt with by the Law Society, particularly that the Law Society has acted 
impartially. Again, there is no power to investigate the merits of the original 
complaint. The remit is limited to solicitors, and there is thus no independent 
oversight of the complaint handling procedures of barristers in Northern Ireland.  
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The Independent Adjudicator of the Law Society in the Republic of Ireland was 
established in October 1997, although the legal basis for the scheme is found in the 
Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. The primary function of the Independent 
Adjudicator is to adjudicate on the manner in which the Law Society has dealt with a 
formal complaint against a solicitor. The remit involves the general review of the 
procedures of the Law Society in relation to the handling of complaints, and making 
recommendations as necessary in order to improve the complaints process. The 
Adjudicator cannot investigate the merits of the original complaint, nor does the remit 
extend to complaints against barristers. 
 
 
The schemes in practice 
 
In Scotland, the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman’s function is to investigate the 
handling of complaints against legal practitioners, and the concern is whether the 
investigation by the professional body was fair and thorough and whether appropriate 
action was taken. The Ombudsman also determines whether a professional body acted 
fairly and reasonably in refusing to investigate a complaint about a practitioner. 
Indeed, about 40 per cent of complaints to the Ombudsman about the Law Society 
concern the refusal of the Law Society to investigate a complaint. 
 
The intervention of the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman is triggered by a 
complainant. When the professional body disposes of a case, dissatisfied 
complainants may refer it to the Ombudsman within six months of disposal. When a 
complaint is received, the Ombudsman identifies, as far as possible, what the 
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problems were in terms of the professional body’s handling of the complaint. The 
complainant is informed that the complaint has been accepted and advised of the 
likely timescale for production of the opinion. At the time of research, this was about 
12 months. The present Ombudsman, who took the post on 1 July 2000, was of the 
opinion that this timescale was unacceptable. Within five months of her appointment, 
she reduced the turnaround time to six months, with the aim of its being between three 
and 13 weeks, depending upon the complexity of the case (see Justice 1 Committee 
2001: col. 2531). 
 
The practitioner is informed that a complaint against him or her has been referred to 
the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman requests the file from the professional body. Until 
recently, the Ombudsman used to send a copy of the complainant’s letter to the 
professional body. The present Ombudsman was concerned about this practice and 
was also aware that some complainants were uncomfortable about it. Copy letters are 
now no longer sent. Instead, the Ombudsman writes to the professional body with a 
list of the concerns expressed by the complainant (see Scottish Legal Services 
Ombudsman 2001: 39). The professional body forwards the file to the Ombudsman, 
and a caseworker reads it and prepares an opinion. Files are dealt with in 
chronological order, being dated from the time the Ombudsman accepts the 
complaint. The draft opinion is sent to the Ombudsman, who reviews it, makes any 
amendments, and finalises it. The opinion is sent to the professional body, the 
complainant and the solicitor.    
 
The Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman has a small workload compared with the 
Legal Services Ombudsman in England and Wales, although the proportion of 
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complaints to the size of the population is similar. In 1999/2000, the Legal Services 
Ombudsman in England and Wales received over 3,000 new inquiries and conducted 
over 1,500 investigations (see Legal Services Ombudsman 2000: 7, 13). In 1999, the 
Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman issued opinions in 100 cases (Scottish Legal 
Services Ombudsman 2000: 5). From April 2000 to March 2001, the office received 
104 complaints which would result in a formal Ombudsman opinion. The volume of 
complaints has fluctuated over the years, and there does not appear to be a definite 
trend. Over the past five years there has been an average of 120 new complaints a 
year which were within the Ombudsman’s remit to investigate. There does not appear 
to have been a significant increase in the number of inquiries received by the office 
over the years, with last year’s figure being 370 (Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman 
2001: 4, 11). The vast majority of cases concern solicitors, with only a handful 
(between one and four each year in the past five years) of cases concerning advocates. 
There have been no cases involving qualified conveyancers or executory practitioners.  
 
Most of the complaints which are not accepted for investigation by the Ombudsman 
are where the complainant has not taken the complaint to one of the professional 
bodies. Others are excluded because they are outside the six-month deadline, or 
because the Ombudsman has already prepared an opinion on the same matter. Some 
complaints refer to aspects of the legal system which are not within the Ombudsman’s 
remit, for example, legal aid, sheriffs and procurators fiscal. If the Ombudsman’s 
office is not able to deal with a complaint, there is an attempt to provide information 
about the person or organisation which may be able to resolve the problem (Scottish 
Legal Services Ombudsman 2001: 11-12). 
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In Northern Ireland, the Lay Observer has two functions. He has to report on the 
nature of complaints being made to the Law Society and the manner in which they are 
dealt with. He also has to examine allegations from the public about the way 
complaints have been dealt with by the Law Society. The majority of his time is spent 
on the first function, which he does by examining the complaints files of the Law 
Society, without a referral by a complainant. Unlike in England and Wales and 
Scotland, the Lay Observer has access to all the files of the Law Society. He conducts 
his oversight responsibility by requesting a list of all the complaints files. From this, 
he selects, usually at random, the files he wants to examine. In 1999-2000, he 
reviewed about 35 per cent of the total complaints included in the computer system of 
the Law Society. From this review, he assesses whether any improvements need to be 
made to the system, and he makes recommendations as appropriate. Individual 
complaints take up very little of his time, as he receives only a small number of 
complaints directly from members of the public. In 1999-2000, there were 20 such 
complaints, and in the previous year, it was 28, the number each year for the past five 
years ranging from 25-32 (Lay Observer 2001: 24). The few complaints he does 
receive are dealt with informally, and it appears that he tries, in the main, to 
conciliate.  
 
In the Irish Republic, the Independent Adjudicator’s function is to respond to 
allegations about the manner in which the Law Society has dealt with a complaint 
against a solicitor. In 1998-99, he reviewed 56 cases at the invitation of complainants, 
a similar number to the previous year, when he examined 59 cases (Independent 
Adjudicator of the Law Society 1999: 9). In these cases, he doe not investigate the 
original complaint, his role being limited to ensuring that the complaint has been dealt 
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with properly. The Adjudicator is also charged with generally reviewing the 
complaint handling procedures of the Law Society, and making recommendations for 
improving these as appropriate. The way he carries out his review is similar to the 
method operated by the Lay Observer. He randomly selects files from the Law 
Society’s complaints files, in order to perform an overview the way the complaints 
section is operating. This is normally done on a six-monthly basis, and he reviews 
about 5 per cent of all the files. 
 
 
Independence and accountability 
 
In order to inspire public confidence, these oversight schemes must be independent 
and accountable. In Scotland, the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman was appointed 
by, and was accountable to, the Secretary of State for Scotland. Since devolution, the 
Ombudsman is appointed by Scottish Ministers. Appointments are made after public 
advertisement and open competition, in consultation with the Lord President of the 
Court of Session. The main mechanism for implementing accountability is through 
the annual report, which since devolution, is laid before the Scottish Parliament. The 
Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman is a part-time appointment, the Ombudsman 
being employed for four days each week, supported by two full-time complaints 
officers, and a part-time secretary. The office is funded by the Scottish Executive, 
operating within a small budget. In 1999-2000, the total cost was £156,000. The 
budget for the forthcoming year has been set at £185,000, to reflect the increased cost 
of developing a new website and increased office rent (Scottish Legal Services 
Ombudsman 2001: 16).  The office has links with the Scottish Executive Justice 
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Department concerning the practical management of the office, but the Scottish 
Executive does not intervene in the way the office is run, nor with handling of 
individual complaints. 
 
In Northern Ireland, the Lay Observer is appointed by the Head of the Department of 
Finance, after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice. Appointments are made on a 
competitive basis, following public service guidelines. The office is funded by the 
Office of Law Reform [5]. The Lay Observer is paid a salary, but has no permanent 
office, no office allocation, and no formal budget for staff.  It is a government funded 
post, and he uses the premises and secretarial support provided by the Office of Law 
Reform, on an informal basis. The Department of Finance meets his expenses. It is a 
part-time appointment, the commitment of the post-holder averaging about one and a 
half days each week 
 
In the Republic of Ireland, the impetus for setting up the Independent Adjudicator 
scheme came from the government, driven by the press and complainants. However, 
the Act establishing the office allowed for the appointment to be made by the Law 
Society, and the post is funded by the Law Society. It is a part-time post, the average 
workload accounting for about two and a half days each week. The Adjudicator is 
formally accountable to the Law Society, presenting his annual report to the President 
of the Law Society of Ireland. This does raise questions about the independence of the 
office. The Adjudicator admits that this does cause problems, but he has no doubts 
about his independence, and believes he has allayed the doubts of the press on this 
score. He is “fully satisfied” that he has “both the resources and independence” to 
carry out his responsibilities (Independent Adjudicator of the Law Society 1999: 5). 
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However, he appreciates that there is a problem of perception for complainants about 
his independence, particularly where there is not a positive result for them.  
 
In none of the schemes (or in England and Wales) can the office holder be legally 
qualified. This ensures that a lay view is incorporated into the complaint handling 
system. The office holders in the three schemes have a variety of backgrounds. The 
present Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman has worked in the public and private 
sectors, including consultancy work on complaint systems; the previous one had been 
a merchant banker. The present Lay Observer has worked in the oil industry and in 
academia. The Independent Adjudicator is a retired banker. As in many 
ombudsman/adjudicator schemes, the office holders are allowed considerable 
autonomy when in post. Because of this, the focus and perspective of the schemes 
depend to a large extent on the personal qualities of the individuals holding the posts 
at any one time. This is particularly evident in Northern Ireland, where the present 
Lay Observer is much more proactive than the previous one, a factor that is reflected 
in the style of the annual reports. The previous office holder produced fairly short, 
factual reports, normally expressing satisfaction with the complaint handling 
functions of the Law Society (see Lay Observer 1998). The annual reports of the 
present Lay Observer are thematic [6], contain a number of recommendations to the 
Law Society, make comments on the statistical tables, and discuss issues in relation to 
the environment in which solicitors practice in Northern Ireland. The Scottish Legal 
Services Ombudsman is very consumer-focussed, considering that to be effective she 
must be able to see the problem from the consumer’s viewpoint.  
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All the office holders are clear that they are not “consumer champions”, as such an 
approach would impact upon the impartiality of the office. The Independent 
Adjudicator has noted that he is “committed to the principal of fairness and balance to 
all parties” (Independent Adjudicator of the Law Society 1999: 5). However, there is 
a sense that in order to be fair, it is sometimes necessary to give a little extra for 
complainants for example, in terms of access, explanation or empowerment. The 
Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman considers that in order to be balanced, access 
and explanation need to be weighted toward the complainant. The Lay Observer has 
remarked that because of the imbalance of power, he is in fact championing the rights 
of consumers, and he has recommended that the Law Society should make its 
complaint handling procedures more complainant orientated (Lay Observer 2001: 10).  
 
All the office holders are clearly independently minded and there can be no doubt 
about their personal integrity. However, only the Scottish scheme has conspicuous 
independence from those investigated. The Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman is 
publicly funded, and those investigated play no part in the appointment. She is 
accountable to the Scottish Parliament, formally presenting her annual report to it. 
Although the Lay Observer is publicly funded, his annual report is presented to the 
Council of the Law Society, as well as the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland and 
the Department of Finance and Personnel. The Law Society does not play a part in the 
Lay Observer’s appointment, but may be consulted by the Head of the Department of 
Finance about the scope and discharge of his functions. The Independent Adjudicator 
is appointed by, funded by and accountable to the Law Society of Ireland, and his 
annual report is presented to the President of the Law Society. This does not mean 
that he does not have operational independence, but it does present problems of 
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perception. Problems of perception also afflict the Lay Observer, who has remarked 
that some members of the public do not believe that he is independent of the Law 
Society. The Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman does not appear to have these 
problems of perception. Recent research has not identified issues about independence, 
the main criticisms of the Ombudsman by complainants being focussed on the remit 
of the Ombudsman and operational matters (Customer Management Consultancy Ltd 
2000; Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman 2000: 17-21; Scottish Consumer Council 
1999). 
 
 
Effectiveness 
 
The effectiveness of the schemes depends upon a number of factors, including their 
accessibility to complainants. Accessibility relates to whether the process is easy for 
complainants to use. The two Irish schemes do not have formal procedures for dealing 
with consumer complaints. They receive so few of them that they are dealt with 
informally, and the practice seems to be to conciliate, as far as possible. 
 
Complainants to the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman have expressed some 
criticism of the quality of the ombudsman’s explanations (Customer Management 
Consultancy Ltd 2000: 21, 23; Scottish Consumer Council 1999: 91). They also 
indicated a desire for personal contact with the Ombudsman, and there was some 
criticism of the time taken by the Ombudsman’s process (Customer Management 
Consultancy Ltd 2000: 15). The present Ombudsman is not satisfied with the time 
taken by her office to process complaints. When she first took office, she was dealing 
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with opinions that had arrived in the office 14 months earlier. She considered it 
embarrassing to criticise the Law Society for two or three months delay, when the 
Ombudsman had taken a year to process the complaint. She has now reduced the 
backlog and is turning around the cases within three months (Justice 1 Committee 
2001: col. 2531). As the Law Society takes a week to send the file, the Ombudsman 
believes that her office ought to take no more than two further weeks to produce an 
opinion. Straightforward cases are now completed within three weeks of the letter of 
complaint. A target of 13 weeks is set for more complex cases, which allows time for 
an interview with the complainant, or for additional information to be provided, for 
example from the solicitor’s file.  
 
There is confusion among complainants about the Scottish Legal Services 
Ombudsman’s role. In a recent survey of complainants to the Law Society of 
Scotland, only 27 per cent of respondents correctly identified the ombudsman’s role, 
as that of examining complaints about the Law Society’s handling of complaints 
against solicitors. One-fifth of respondents thought that the ombudsman could impose 
a decision on the Law Society, and, more worryingly, almost one-fifth seemed to have 
no idea at all what the ombudsman did (Scottish Consumer Council 1999: 65). Since 
that research, the ombudsman issued a new leaflet, which will hopefully clarify the 
role (Scottish Consumer Council 1999: 91). Clarification of the role will not however 
answer complainants’ criticisms that the ombudsman cannot examine the merits of 
cases (Customer Management Consultancy Ltd 2000: 19, 31). In Northern Ireland, the 
Lay Observer believes that his title is confusing for complainants, and that it does not 
really give an indication of his role. He has recommended that that his title be 
reconsidered to make it more meaningful to the public (Lay Observer 1999: 8) and in 
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order to highlight the independence of the office (Lay Observer 2000: 11). Consumer 
representatives in Northern Ireland also express concern that the public do not know 
what a Lay Observer is, or what he does, and that the name itself sounds weak [7]. In 
the Republic of Ireland, the Office of the Independent Adjudicator was widely 
publicised when it was established. There has been no research as to whether the 
public is knowledgeable about the role. 
 
The question of effectiveness is also related to what the schemes are designed to 
achieve. One important factor about all three schemes is that they are not designed to 
give redress in relation to the substance of the complaint against the lawyer. The 
function of all schemes is the review of the way the complaint has been handled. The 
merits of the original complaint are not investigated, and there can be no substitution 
of the professional body’s decision on this. The schemes do not exist as an appeal 
against the decisions of the professional bodies. The purpose of all the schemes is to 
ensure that the professional body has carried out the complaint-handling function 
fairly, thoroughly and impartially. As is the case for the Legal Services Ombudsman 
in England and Wales, this can be a source of confusion to complainants, who may 
have misconceptions about the role of these oversight bodies.  
 
This is especially so in the case of the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman, as 
consumers usually consider that an ombudsman’s role is the redress of individual 
grievances. Despite the fact that the Ombudsman’s literature makes the remit clear, 
many complainants have the expectation that the ombudsman can investigation the 
original complaint (Scottish Consumer Council 1999: 91). They take their case to the 
Ombudsman because they are unhappy with the outcome rather than the manner in 
 19
Po
t-Print
which it was investigated by the professional body (Scottish Consumer Council 1999: 
62-63). Complainants are critical because the Ombudsman cannot examine the merits 
of decisions, and many find it frustrating that provided the process is satisfactory 
nothing can be achieved by referring their case to the Ombudsman (Customer 
Management Consultancy Ltd 2000: 21). The Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman 
has admitted that complainants are frustrated because there can be no examination of 
the merits of cases. It is therefore no surprise that many complainants would like to 
see the Ombudsman’s remit extended to allow her to consider the merits of cases, as 
well as handling (Customer Management Consultancy Ltd 2000:21). The previous 
Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman has noted that if complaints are to remain as part 
of the self-regulatory framework of the legal profession, “there requires to be an 
Ombudsman’s service with greater regulatory powers” (Scottish Legal Services 
Ombudsman 2000: 19). 
 
The two schemes in Ireland are not “ombudsmen”. However, they do stand at the 
apex of the complaint-handling process for the two Law Societies. It is probably fair 
to assume therefore that those who are not satisfied with the decision from the Law 
Society will expect an investigation into the merits of the original complaint. The Lay 
Observer has noted that the main problem, when dealing with individual 
complainants, is “managing … perceptions and expectations about the role and remit” 
(Lay Observer 2000; 17). There is therefore a problem of perception with these 
schemes, in that the public may believe that the role of the ombudsmen/adjudicators is 
to examine the merits of the case. The task, therefore, seems to be one of managing 
expectations, making it very clear to the public the limits and range of powers of the 
schemes. 
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 Despite the confusion and frustration of complainants, none of the post-holders is 
seeking increased powers to investigate the original complaint. Indeed, in England 
and Wales, where the Legal Services Ombudsman has this power, the number of 
investigations into the original complaint is very small. There, the Legal Services 
Ombudsman decided to take “a more robust approach to referring cases back to the 
professional body for reconsideration”. She has pursued “a deliberate strategy of 
demanding that the professional bodies handle complaints about their members 
properly, rather than examining individual complaints from scratch” (Legal Services 
Ombudsman 2000: 15). The present Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman had not 
been in post long enough at the time of this research to have formed an opinion about 
this. She did however note that the views of the Legal Services Ombudsman in 
England and Wales meant that there, the original complaint was only examined in rare 
cases. Certainly, any change in the powers to examine the merits of cases would 
require more resources for all of the schemes. For the Scottish scheme, it would 
require a larger office, with more caseworkers. For the two Irish schemes, such a 
change would be impossible under the present arrangements for their operation, as 
they have no office facilities or dedicated staff. 
 
 
Remedies 
 
In order to be effective, the schemes must have adequate remedies. It is clear from 
what has been said above, that the primary aim of all three schemes is not to 
investigate the original complaint of the consumer against the lawyer. The purpose of 
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all the schemes is to ensure that the professional bodies deal with complaints 
effectively. In other words, these ombudsmen/adjudicator/lay observers are 
performing a review function. What powers do they have to ensure that their review is 
effective and achieves positive results for complainants? 
 
In Scotland, the result of the investigation may reveal shortcomings in the 
professional body’s handling of the complaint. If this is the case, the Scottish Legal 
Services Ombudsman can make a number of recommendations. She can recommend 
that the professional body provide the complainant with information and explanations 
about the underlying complaint and how it was dealt with. There can also be a 
recommendation that the professional body carries out a further investigation or that it 
reconsiders its conclusions. The Ombudsman can also recommend that the 
professional body exercise its statutory powers as regards the practitioner. This 
means, for example, that the Ombudsman can recommend that the Council of the Law 
Society should consider prosecuting the solicitor before the Scottish Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tribunal. The Ombudsman can also take a case to this tribunal, although 
this power has never been used. However, the present Ombudsman has identified a set 
of circumstances which might lead to a direct referral to the tribunal, for example, 
where the Ombudsman identifies strong grounds for professional misconduct and the 
Law Society refuses to investigate or re-investigate (Scottish Legal Services 
Ombudsman 2001: 26)  
 
Since 1997, the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman can recommend that the 
professional body pay compensation of up to £1,000, for the inconvenience and 
distress caused by a poorly handled investigation. In 1999, the Ombudsman made 
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recommendations for sanctions in fifteen cases, ranging in amount from £100 to £700. 
The aggregate amount was £3,950, with the average recommendation being £264 
(Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman 2000:8-9). In 2000-2001, the average amount of 
compensation recommended was £350; there were four cases where the maximum of 
£1,000 was recommended; and the total compensation recommended was £11,475 
(Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman 2001: 23-26). The Ombudsman can also 
recommend that the professional body reimburse part or all of the cost of making the 
complaint to the Ombudsman. This latter power has only been used since the present 
Ombudsman took up her appointment, and is typically £25.  
 
In the main, the professional bodies accept the Ombudsman’s recommendations, and 
pay the award. In 1999, the Law Society paid a lesser amount in two cases (Scottish 
Legal Services Ombudsman 2000: 9). In 1998, one recommendation for compensation 
was not accepted (Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman 1999: 7). The previous 
Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman has also withdrawn (Scottish Legal Services 
Ombudsman 1999: 7) or reduced (Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman 2000: 9) 
compensation recommendations after accepting the professional body’s 
representations. The fact that awards are invariably paid may indicate a respect for the 
office of the ombudsman. It could however indicate that the ombudsman is making 
the award based on an assessment of what the professional body will accept, rather 
than on the needs of the case. 
 
The professional body must respond to any recommendation within three months. If it 
is not willing to comply with any recommendation, the Ombudsman may publicise 
that failure together with any reason given for not complying, the costs of publicity 
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being met by the professional body. In 1998, the Ombudsman used this power on two 
occasions, in relation to the Law Society. The cases were publicised in the Scotsman 
newspaper, and included the Law Society’s statement of reasons for not complying 
(Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman 1999: 7). The Ombudsman also made 
arrangements during 1998 to publicise the Faculty of Advocates’ rejection of a 
recommendation to pay £400 to a complainant (Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman 
1999: 31). The power was not used in the last year, although there was one case where 
it almost was (Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman 2001: 25-26). Neither the 
complainant nor practitioner may be identified in any publicity. 
 
In Northern Ireland, the Lay Observer’s remit is to ensure that the Law Society’s 
processes are fair. He has no power to award compensation to complainants, even if 
he is critical of the Law Society’s handling of the case. What he does do, is to try to 
achieve a satisfactory solution for the complainant, if possible. In the Irish Republic, 
the Independent Adjudicator can recommend to the Law Society that it reconsiders 
the complaint. He cannot make any awards of compensation. The two Irish schemes 
are not designed to provide compensation to individual complainants. Their aim in 
individual cases is to try to obtain a satisfactory result, either by recommending that 
the Law Societies reconsider the complaint, or provide a satisfactory explanation to 
the complainant. Only in Scotland, can there be compensation for the complainant, 
where the some fault is found with the way the professional body has dealt with the 
complaint. In none of the schemes is there any power to enforce the 
recommendations.  
 
  
 24
P
st-Print
Effective oversight 
 
All the schemes have the function of ensuring that the self-regulatory schemes 
operated by the professional bodies are fair and effective. Given this emphasis, how 
effective are they in doing so? The Scottish scheme is the most wide-ranging of the 
three, in that it covers a range of legal professionals, extending the remit beyond 
solicitors, to advocates, conveyancers and executory practitioners. This follows the 
practice in England and Wales, where the Legal Services Ombudsman’s remit extends 
to solicitors, barristers, legal executives, licensed conveyancers and patent agents. The 
two Irish schemes are limited to solicitors. There is a view that this does not present a 
problem, as it is the task of solicitors to ensure that barristers give good service. 
However, it does mean that the two schemes in Ireland do not provide independent 
oversight of the complaints procedures of the whole legal profession. The Lay 
Observer in Northern Ireland believes that this is an anomaly which should be 
addressed (Lay Observer 2001: 10). 
  
In Scotland, information about the professional bodies’ handling of complaints can 
only be obtained as a result of an individual complaint. In addition to providing a 
remedy for the individual, where appropriate, the Ombudsman can make general 
recommendations using the information gained from the cases investigated. These 
recommendations can be made to the professional bodies, and to the Scottish 
Parliament. They need not be confined to the complaint-handling functions of the 
professional bodies. They can also relate to other issues of good practice, which may 
have the effect of reducing the numbers of complaints. Recognising that most 
complaints are about communication problems, the previous Scottish Legal Services 
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Ombudsman recommended on a number of occasions that the Law Society require 
solicitors to send letters of engagement to clients, containing information about the 
instructions and the basis of the charges. From 1994, he tried to persuade the Law 
Society that this would prevent misunderstandings. Finally, in 1999, the Law Society, 
although not making it a rule, agreed that the solicitors’ Code of Conduct should be 
amended. Solicitors are now to provide information on fees, who will handle the 
transaction in the firm, and what the client should do if dissatisfied with the service 
(Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman 2000: 11).  
 
In relation to complaint-handling, the Ombudsman did recommend that the Law 
Society provide the public with information about firms with serious and persistent 
record of inadequate professional service, but this was rejected. There have been 
successes. For example, there has been an increase in lay input into the complaint-
handling process. The Law Society has also broadly accepted the need for complaints 
about conduct to be investigated separately from complaints about inadequate 
professional services. Another eventual success was the recommendation that the Law 
Society establish a telephone helpline, so that people could access the Law Society 
easily for advice about how to make a complaint. The previous Ombudsman believed 
that the commitment of the Law Society to complaints-handling had improved over 
the years he had held office, but was very critical of the complaint handling process in 
the Faculty of Advocates. The major criticism here was the lack of lay involvement, 
and he tried, without success, to persuade the Faculty to establish a committee with 
two lay people as a minimum to deal with complaints. 
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In Northern Ireland, the present Lay Observer has made a number of 
recommendations since taking up office in 1998. For example, he made suggestions 
for improvements in the Law Society’s statistical review, which were accepted. He 
also made recommendations about the amount of lay participation, and as a result, the 
number of lay representatives on the Professional Conduct Committee has been 
increased from two to four. The Lay Observer notes that the Law Society’s response 
to his recommendations has been “generally most positive and constructive” (Lay 
Observer 2000: 7). He has adopted a very proactive approach, seeing his role as 
collaborative and educational. 
 
In the Irish Republic, the Independent Adjudicator made seven recommendations to 
the Law Society in his first Annual Report. These included the development of a 
practice management course, where solicitors could be directed to attend. The 
Independent Adjudicator also believes that the Law Society should encourage 
solicitors to confirm instructions and costs in writing. The validity of the 
recommendations was accepted by the Law Society, and the Independent Adjudicator 
believes that the recommendations he has made as a result of this overview have 
resulted in more investment by the Law Society in the complaints process. In 
addition, of the five amendments to the legislation affecting solicitors in 1998, two 
related to the Independent Adjudicator’s recommendations.  
 
There can be no doubt therefore that these independent oversight schemes are a force 
for the good. However, their limitations must also be recognised. The chief advantage 
of the two schemes in Ireland is their power of audit. Unlike the Legal Services 
Ombudsman in England and Wales and the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman, 
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these two schemes include a power to access all the complaints files of the relevant 
Law Societies. Indeed, the focus of their work is in conducting an overview of the 
system in this way, rather than dealing with individual complaints. The Scottish Legal 
Services Ombudsman cannot conduct a general audit of the cases that are not referred 
to her. She can only investigate where there is a complaint from a member of the 
public. There is no power to make general inspections of files. This gives only a 
partial view of the system, and does depend upon complainants having the tenacity to 
pursue their grievances. A power to conduct an audit may ensure a more effective 
oversight function, providing a middle way between self-regulation, and an 
independent body to deal with complaints. The previous Scottish Legal Services 
Ombudsman has recommended that the powers of the ombudsman be extended to 
enable an annual audit of cases determined by the professional bodies where there has 
been no complaint to the ombudsman. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The legal profession, like other professions, has traditionally enjoyed the privilege of 
self-regulation, within a statutory framework. However, in recent years, self-
regulation has come increasingly under attack, and questions have been raised about 
the appropriate regulatory mechanisms for professions in general and client 
complaints in particular. These questions occur when the professions are failing to 
inspire public confidence. One solution to this problem is for the professional bodies 
to improve their procedures and increase client satisfaction. Consumers expect high 
standards of service, and if their expectations are not met, they will complain and 
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expect redress. They are no longer prepared to defer to the professionals and if 
professional bodies fail to deliver consumer satisfaction, governments have shown 
themselves prepared to impose schemes to protect the consumer interest.  
 
Complaints procedures represent only a small part of regulation and self-regulation. 
They are however those aspects of regulation which directly affect consumers. 
Confidence in these systems can inspire confidence in the regulatory system as a 
whole. Conversely, if the redress system fails to inspire public confidence, it calls into 
question the whole regulatory system. Joint regulation is one method of achieving 
public confidence in the system and client satisfaction with legal services. The self-
regulatory stage of the process is less costly, more flexible and more amenable to 
change than statutory regulation would be. It can be more effective because it avoids 
the implementation problems associated with coercive mechanisms of control. 
Because there will always be public scepticism with self-regulation, oversight of the 
self-regulatory mechanisms by an independent body is necessary. 
 
The schemes presented in this paper represent two types of joint-regulation. The two 
Irish schemes have very clear auditing functions, with wide ranging powers of 
inspection. They can obtain a full picture of the operation of the systems. Their 
drawback is the lack of power to award compensation where the professional bodies 
have failed to deliver effective complaint handling. Nor can they compel the 
professional bodies to follow their recommendations. In addition, they are partial 
systems, having oversight only over solicitors. Barristers and other legal professionals 
are not included in their remit. The Scottish system, which is more akin to the one in 
England and Wales, can provide compensation, but it is dependent on individual 
 29
P
st-Print
complaints in order to access the professional bodies’ systems. It lacks the power to 
conduct a complete audit of the system, nor does it have powers of compulsion. The 
two Irish schemes do seem to be more internally coherent, but they are limited to the 
solicitors branch of the profession. 
 
The problem with all the schemes is the limitation on their remit. All are confined to 
an investigation of process rather than merit. If this is accepted as an appropriate role, 
a major task is that of addressing public expectations in this regard. The public must 
also be convinced that the oversight body has the power to effect change to the first 
tier process, and thus be persuaded that this is an appropriate role. Unless this can be 
achieved there will be no confidence in this joint public and private, self-regulatory 
and statutory, system, and pressure for a completely independent redress mechanism 
becomes hard to resist. 
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 Notes 
 
[1] An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Joint Meeting of the Law and 
Society Association and Research Committee on Sociology of Law, held in Budapest, 
Hungary, on 4-7 July 2001.  
[2] There has been a comparative study of solicitors’ complaints procedures in 
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (see Ross and Enoch 1996).  
[3] The research was carried out over a twelve-month period, from January 2000. It 
comprised interviews with the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman (previous and 
present); the Lay Observer in Northern Ireland; and the Independent Adjudicator of 
the Law Society in the Irish Republic. There were also interviews with staff in the 
client relations sections of the Law Societies in the three countries, and consumer 
organisations in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Information was also gathered from 
published sources, in particular the annual reports of the bodies concerned. The author 
would like to record her most grateful thanks to those who agreed to be interviewed, 
for their openness and co-operation. This project was made possible by funds from the 
Research Enhancement Fund, Nottingham Trent University, which support is much 
appreciated.   
[4] The British and Irish Ombudsman Association was set up in 1993, originally as 
the United Kingdom Ombudsman Association (the name change in 1994 followed the 
inclusion of three ombudsman schemes from the Irish Republic as members). It was 
formed on a self-regulatory basis, as a result of concern that the title “ombudsman” 
was being used inappropriately. The Legal Services Ombudsman and the Scottish 
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Legal Services Ombudsman are full voting members of the British and Irish 
Ombudsman Association. The Lay Observer has associate status.  
[5] The Office of Law Reform deals with civil law and policy that does not fall within 
the province of other departments. In effect, it deals with all legal matters except 
crime, employment and social services. Regulation of the legal profession is within its 
remit. 
[6] His first annual report took as the theme “client satisfaction” (Lay Observer 1999), 
his second one “self-regulation and client care” (Lay Observer 2000). His most recent 
annual report focuses on complainant management (Lay Observer 2001).  
[7] Personal interview at the General Consumer Council for Northern Ireland. 
[8] This kind of power would also strengthen the oversight function of the Legal 
Services Ombudsman in England and Wales. The case for this was argued in R.James 
and M. Seneviratne (1995: 206). The Legal Services Ombudsman in England and 
Wales has not called for this power. Such a power would have huge resource 
implications for her office. 
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